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INTRODUCTION

Imagine a railroad whose holdings span the country, connecting
the nation's largest cities and providing passenger and freight services that are critical to the economy's functioning. State A, through
which this rail line runs, finds itself nearing insolvency. Seeking funds
but wishing not to upset its politically powerful voters, this state levies a tax exclusively applicable to railroads.
State B, a neighboring state, is more in need of money than
State A and decides to impose a tax on all commercial enterprises
within its territory. However, due to pressure from local interest
groups, State B grants exemptions to trucks, barges, and aircraft.
While far from the only business paying the tax, the railroad now
finds itself at a severe competitive disadvantage as compared to
other carriers.
State C adopts a third approach. This state notices that many
common carriers within its jurisdiction- airlines, railroads, barges,
and the like-are not local and levies a tax that applies to all transportation businesses on an equal footing. Although this tax applies to
railroads and their competitors equally, such that none are at a competitive disadvantage, the predominantly local nontransportation
firms are not subject to the tax.
Each of these situations disadvantages the railroad, but do any
of them discriminate against it illegally? This scenario highlights a
problem that has arisen in the interpretation of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act' (4-R Act), a comprehensive
statute passed by Congress in 1976 with the purpose of restoring the
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financial sustainability of the nation's railroads In relevant part, the
statute reads:
(b) The following acts unreasonably burden and discriminate
against interstate commerce, and a State, subdivision of a State,
or authority acting for a State or subdivision of a State may not
do any of them:
(1) Assess rail transportation property at a value that has a
higher ratio to the true market value of the rail transportation
property than the ratio that the assessed value of other commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction
has to the true market value of the other commercial and industrial property.
(2) Levy or collect a tax on an assessment that may not be made
under paragraph (1) of this subsection.
(3) Levy or collect an ad valorem property tax on rail transportation property at a tax rate that exceeds the tax rate applicable
to commercial and industrial property in the same assessment
jurisdiction.
(4) Impose another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier
providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction of the Board
under this part.'
The first three subsections of this provision apply exclusively to
property taxes4 and specify that such taxes may not discriminate
against rail operators as compared to all "other commercial and industrial property."5 The concluding catch-all provision, which applies
2 4-R Act § 101, 90 Stat at 33, codified at 45 USC § 801 (describing the policy of the 4-R
Act as being "to provide the means to rehabilitate and maintain the physical facilities, improve
the operations and structure, and restore the financial stability of the railway system").
3 49 USC § 11501.
4 49 USC § 11501(b)(1)-(3).
5 49 USC § 11501(a)(4) (defining "commercial and industrial property" as "property,
other than transportation property and land used primarily for agricultural purposes or timber
growing, devoted to a commercial or industrial use and subject to a property tax levy"). The
qualifier "subject to a property tax levy" has led to substantial litigation. The Supreme Court
concluded that commercial and industrial property that is fidly exempted from a tax is not
within the comparison class, as it would no longer be "subject to" the allegedly discriminatory
levy. Department of Revenue of Oregon v ACF Industries, Inc, 510 US 332, 342 (1994). This
means that states can evade the 4-R Act's proscription against discriminatory taxation by simply granting full exemptions to favored taxpayers. However, the Supreme Court has also held
that this only applies to property tax levies. As such, a taxpayer that is fully exempt from a
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to nonproperty taxes, does not provide any comparison class.' This

silence has created great uncertainty for states trying to assess the
legality of intuitively reasonable distinctions between railroads and

other taxpayers in their tax regimes, as well as substantial exposure
for railroads, which are left guessing as to potential state tax liability.
The circuit courts are divided over how to determine the class
against which allegedly discriminatory taxes should be compared un-

der subsection (b)(4). Some courts-including the Fifth,7 Seventh,'
and Ninth9 Circuits-have adopted a "functional approach," which
imports the "commercial and industrial" comparison class from the

preceding three subsections into the catch-all provision. Under this
approach, State B's tax scheme would be permissible despite the
competitive harm that railroads will incur, since railroads are not discriminated against as compared to the broader class of all commercial and industrial taxpayers. 0 State C's tax scheme, however, would

violate the 4-R Act, as only transportation businesses are subject to
the tax." And of course, because State A's tax applies only to railroads, it would be impermissibly discriminatory under the 4-R Act
no matter which comparison class one adopts.
A sizeable minority of courts, including the Eighth Circuit'" and
several state supreme courts," have crafted a "competitive approach." Emphasizing the 4-R Act's goal of restoring railroads to

private-sector competitiveness, these courts would only invalidate a

nonproperty tax-taxes that are covered by subsection (b)(4)-remains within the comparison
class of § 11501(b). CSX Transportation,Inc v Alabama Departmentof Revenue, 131 S Ct 1101,
1111 (2011) (noting that the analysis undertaken in ACF Industries has no bearing on a claim
brought under subsection (b)(4)).
6
49 USC § 11501(b)(4).
7 Kansas City Southern Railway Co v McNamara, 817 F2d 368, 374 (5th Cir 1987).
8
Kansas City Southern Railway Co v Koeller, 653 F3d 496, 509 (7th Cir 2011).
9 Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co v Arizona, 78 F3d 438, 443 (9th Cir 2011).
10 Of course, the fact that direct competitors are exempted from this nonproperty tax
does not remove them from the comparison class under this approach. See note 5. Nevertheless, since discrimination is being measured vis-A-vis the larger class of all commercial and
industrial taxpayers, it is unlikely that the exemption from the tax of a small subset of this class,
even an important subset such as competitors, will constitute discrimination as compared to the
class as a whole.
11 Consider Koeller, 653 F3d at 509.
12 Burlington Northern, Santa Fe Railway Co v Lohman, 193 F3d 984, 985 (8th Cir 1999).
The Eleventh Circuit also applied this approach in Norfolk Southern Railway Co v Alabama
Department of Revenue, 550 F3d 1306, 1308 (11th Cir 2008). However, in that case the parties
stipulated to the approach, and the court, noting its misgivings on how best to resolve the split,
declined to definitively adopt the competitive approach. Id at 1308 n 3.
13 Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co v Bair, 338 NW2d 338, 346 (Iowa
1983); Burlington Northern Railroad Co v Commissioner of Revenue, 509 NW2d 551, 553
(Minn 1993).
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state tax regime that places a higher burden on railroads than their
direct competitors. Under this rule, State C's tax scheme would be
permissible, whereas State B's would contravene the statute."
Despite this disagreement, the Supreme Court has declined to
resolve the question.'5 As such, courts interpreting the 4-R Act have
tended to adopt the approach most likely to achieve a "fair" outcome in the instant case while strictly cabining their holdings to the
facts before them. While this might have an intuitive appeal, it creates considerable difficulties for the courts that must apply the law in
future cases and the states and railroads that must conform to its dictates. For example, the comparison class adopted by an earlier court
may be inappropriate to the facts of a later case, especially when a
different type of tax, or a tax on different conduct, is at issue. On the
other hand, adopting a new comparison class would make it exceedingly difficult for states and railroads to determine how the statute
will be applied to any given tax and would force courts to make a
threshold determination concerning the applicable comparison class
before addressing the discrimination issue.
This Comment proposes a new interpretation of subsection
(b)(4) that provides a single, coherent approach to these cases while
still preserving the flexibility and functionality necessary to give effect to the intent of the 4-R Act. Part I discusses the text, history, and
purposes of the 4-R Act, noting in particular Congress's dual concern
with protecting the financial sustainability of railroads and preserving states' discretion in crafting tax policy-an area long considered
squarely within their domain. Part II reviews the circuit split that has
developed in interpreting the 4-R Act, paying particularly close attention to the conflicting and underdetermined approaches that
many courts have employed in resolving the comparison-class question under § 11501(b)(4). Part III discusses the shortcomings of these
approaches, both as a matter of statutory interpretation and as a
matter of policy. Part IV then presents an alternative solution to this
circuit split, one that shifts the focus from identifying an elusive
comparison class to assessing the rationality of a given state-defined
classification. Allowing states to draw reasonable distinctions between taxpayers is consistent with the language and subsequent judicial interpretations of the 4-R Act and reflects the approach employed by the courts in assessing tax discrimination claims in other
14
Under Supreme Court precedent, full exemptions from nonproperty taxes of the sort
addressed by subsection (b)(4) are not removed from the comparison class. See note 5.
15 CSX Transportation,131 S Ct at 1107 n 5 (2011) (declining to address the issue over a
dissent from Justice Clarence Thomas advocating adoption of the functional approach).
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contexts-namely, Equal Protection Clause and Dormant Commerce Clause cases. Such an approach affords states wider discretion
in exercising their power to tax while continuing to protect railroads
against the most egregious forms of discrimination.
I. WORKIN' ON THE RAILROAD: THE INCEPTION,
IMPLEMENTATION, AND INTERPRETATION OF THE 4-R ACT

Much of the debate concerning subsection (b)(4) has centered
on how to protect railroads from overly burdensome taxation without rendering them "most-preferred taxpayers"-that is, giving them
every tax advantage that any other taxpayer may claim. Although
this concern reflects the intuition that an overbroad reading of
§ 11501's protections would be too generous to railroads, it also
evinces a concern with protecting states' taxing prerogatives.
The 4-R Act acknowledged the inability of existing law to provide meaningful protection to railroads from adverse tax treatment
by the states and sought to remedy this through the implementation
of an array of bright-line rules. Although bright-line rules might
make sense in the context of subsections (b)(1)-(3), which deal with
specific types of tax discrimination, they are ill-suited for the myriad
of tax scenarios covered by subsection (b)(4), perhaps explaining the
courts' reluctance to commit to a fixed comparison class to cover all
claims brought under that provision. A review of the text, legislative
history, and subsequent judicial interpretation of the 4-R Act reveals
the need for a new approach to this problem.
A. The Text of 49 USC § 11501(b)
Section 11501(b) prohibits states and municipalities from imposing various types of taxes that discriminate against railroads. The
first three prohibitions deal specifically with discriminatory property
taxes. For example, states may not "[a]ssess rail transportation property at a value that has a higher ratio to the true market value of the
rail transportation property" than that assessed on "other commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction."'"

Similarly, states may not levy or collect a tax based on such assessments.'7 Ad valorem taxes'" on rail property "at a rate that exceeds

49 USC § 11501(b)(1) (emphasis added).
USC § 11501(b)(2).
18 An ad valorem tax is "[a] tax imposed proportionally on the value of something (esp.
real property), rather than on its quantity or some other measure." Black's Law Dictionary
1594 (West 9th ed 2009).
16

17 49
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the tax rate applicable to commercial and industrialproperty in the

same assessment jurisdiction" are also barred.'9
Despite the seemingly categorical language of these provisions,
there are a number of limitations on their breadth. Notably, the comparison class includes only property "subject to a property tax levy."'2. In
Departmentof Revenue of Oregon v ACF Industries, Inc," the Supreme
Court held this language permits states to grant full exemptions from

property taxes to nonrailroad taxpayers since those taxpayers would no
longer fall within the comparison class. Furthermore, the class explicitly excludes agricultural and timber land, allowing preferential tax

treatment with regard to these two industries in which states have traditionally had a special policy interest.2
In sharp contrast to the detailed prohibitions above, subsection
(b)(4) provides a much more open-ended directive, declaring it

illegal for a state to "impose another tax that discriminates against a
rail carrier providing transportation." 4 The Supreme Court has interpreted this last prohibition as applying to all nonproperty taxes.2
As mentioned above, however, the question of the proper comparison class against which to measure such alleged discrimination has

divided the courts.
It bears noting that a defined comparison class is not the only
important omission from subsection (b)(4). The statute also fails to
describe what constitutes discrimination with regard to nonproperty
taxes under that subsection. In the property context, the statute specifically defines discriminatory tax assessments as those in which the
ratio of assessed-to-true value of railroad property is greater than 5
percent of that for nonrailroad property and provides a detailed
19

49 USC § 11501(b)(3) (emphasis added).
49 USC § 11501(a)(4).
21 510 US 332 (1994).
22 Id at 347-48 (finding that, although partial exemptions are prohibited by the Act, full
exemptions are not since such exempted property is not "subject to a tax"). Note, however,
that this holding is limited to property taxes. Because the language on which ACF Industries
relied mentioned only that the property must be subject to a property tax, full exemptions from
nonproperty taxes do not take a taxpayer outside the ambit of the comparison class. See CSX
Transportation,Inc v Alabama Departmentof Revenue, 131 S Ct 1101, 1111 (2011).
23
49 USC § 11501(a)(4).
24
49 USC § 11501(b)(4). The original language of the 4-R Act stated that "the imposition of any other tax which results in discriminatory treatment of a common carrier by railroad" would violate the statute. 4-R Act § 306(d), 90 Stat at 54 (emphasis added). The wording
was changed as part of a general recodification, but Congress made clear that the rewording
should not be understood to change the meaning or interpretation of the terms. CSX Transportation, 131 S Ct at 1105 n 1.
25 CSX Transportation, 131 S Ct at 1107-08 (rejecting the view that subsection (b)(4)
applies only to in-lieu taxes). See text accompanying notes 91-98.
20
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description of how to allocate the burden of proof and calculate true
market value.' It also specifies that a discriminatory ad valorem tax
is any tax that applies to rail property at a higher rate than to other
commercial and industrial property."' But no such definition of discrimination is provided with regard to subsection (b)(4). Although
the Supreme Court has held that the term "discrimination" must
take its ordinary definition in this context -"failure to treat all persons equally when no reasonable distinction can be found between
those favored and those not favored""-the content and operation of
this standard were not elucidated." The result is a very vague prohibition, applying to all nonproperty taxes but describing neither how
to determine if a tax discriminates nor against whom any differentials should be compared.
B.

The Legislative History of 49 USC § 11501(b)

The 4-R Act was over fifteen years in the making,3' and over that
time the language of what would become § 11501(b) underwent substantial modification. First, this Section considers the problems facing railroads in the middle of the twentieth century that motivated
Congress to adopt the 4-R Act. It then discusses the competing goals
Congress sought to balance in addressing these problems. Finally,
this Section reviews how these policies were reflected in the various
drafts of the bill that emerged in the decade and a half preceding the
Act's ultimate adoption.
1. The financial plight of the railroads.
To give content to the ambiguous text of § 11501(b), it is helpful
to consider the historical moment in which the 4-R Act arose. Beginning with the conclusion of World War I, the rail industry in America
entered a period of slow decline.' This decline accelerated midcentury as competition from new modes of transportation eroded the
49 USC § 11501(c).
49 USC § 11501(b)(3).
28 CSX Transportation,131 S Ct at 1108.
29 See id at 1109 n 8 (observing that evidence of discrimination only establishes a prima
facie violation of subsection (b)(4), which might be rebutted with a sufficient justification from
the state).
30
National TransportationPolicy, S Rep No 87-445, 87th Cong, 1st Sess Ill-IV (1961)
(describing the report as addressing the "fundamentals" that need attention and situating the
report as a first step in the process of legislative reform).
31 See US Department of Transportation, The Northeast Problem, in Paul W. MacAvoy
and John W. Snow, eds, Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform 9, 11-12 (American
Enterprise Institute 1977).
26
27
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railroad industry's market share in both freight32 and passenger services.3 Consequently, the number of miles of railroad track carrying
passengers fell by over two-thirds between 1950 and 1971, from
147,511 miles to 42,000 miles.' Between 1960 and 1970 alone, onethird of all railroad companies went out of business. The outlook for
the rail industry only grew grimmer over the next decade as the
number of operating rail carriers declined by an additional 46 percent. " The high cost of maintaining rail infrastructure did not help
matters.
At the same time, the broader economy was changing in ways unfavorable to the railroads. Growth in the services industry and decline
in the commodity markets chipped away at railroads' potential business. New businesses tended to be fairly mobile and able to easily
cross state lines, thus constraining states' ability to tax them. In contrast, the large and immobile fixed capital of railroads left them captive to the states in which they were located, making them an attractive source of revenue for state legislatures. That these railroads were
often nonlocal enterprises further incentivized policymakers to
target them, as the railroads faced greater costs in exacting political

32
Between 1960 and 1975, the ton-miles of freight moved by air transportation rose by
527 percent versus just over 30 percent for railroads (data for intercity truck transportation is
not available for this time period). See Research and Innovative Technology Administration,
Statistics, Table 1-49: U.S. Ton-Miles of Freight
Bureau of Transportation
(July 2011), online at http://www.bts.gov/publications/national-transportationstatistics/
html/table_01 49.html (visited Sept 19, 2012) (noting that ton-miles of freight increased from
553 to 3,470 for air transportation and from 572,309 to 754,252 for rail).
33 Between 1960 and 1975, passenger-miles traveled increased by 285 percent for air
transit and 89 percent for highway transit, while fatling by 77 percent for rail transit. See Research and Innovative Technology Administration, Bureau of Transportation Statistics,
Table 1-40: U.S. Passenger-Miles (Jan 2012), online at http://www.bts.gov/publications/
nationaltransportation-statistics/html/table 01 40.htmi (visited Sept 19, 2012) (reporting an
increase in passenger-miles from 31,099 to 119,591 for air transportation, an increase from
1,272,078 to 2,404,954 for highway transportation, and a decrease from 17,064 to 3,931 for rail).
34 Oliver Jensen, The American Heritage History of Railroads in America 299 (American
Heritage 1975).
35 See
Research
and
Innovative
Technology
Administration,
Bureau
of Transportation Statistics, Rail Profile (April 2011), online at http://www.bts.gov/publications/
nationaltransportation-statistics/html/table-rail-profile.htm (visited Sept 19, 2012) (noting
that the number of railroad companies declined from 106 to 71 during this period).
36
See id.
37 The cost of rehabilitating one mile of railroad could reach as high as $100,000 in 1980.
Missouri Highway and Transportation Department, Missouri Rail Plan 1980 Update table
4-106 table 4-53 (Sept 1980).
38
US Department of Transportation, The Northeast Problem at 17-20 (cited in note 31).
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retribution against the politicians of a state in which they were not
resident.39
The Doyle Report, a 1961 US Senate study, first documented
the extent of state overtaxation of railroads. ' Focusing solely on
property tax assessments, the Doyle Report found that all thirty-one
states studied assessed railroad property at a higher percentage of
true value than other property, resulting in railroads paying over
$140 million more in taxes than they otherwise would.4" Although

this was not typically a result of facial discrimination against railroads (indeed, many states nominally prohibited such practices), the
wide discretion granted to tax assessors and the difficulty of ensuring2
equitable assessments allowed the "political problem" to fester.
This practice was still widespread into the mid-1970s."

Needless to say, the combination of shrinking income and rising
tax liabilities" proved toxic, threatening the bankruptcy of national
rail carriers and, impliedly, their nationalization at taxpayer expense. 4 Although Congress first began to consider reforms to the rail
industry in the early 1960s,' it was the collapse of the Penn Central

Transportation Company in 1970 that finally spurred action. In that
year, Congress passed the Rail Passenger Service Act, 47 which creat-

ed the National Railroad Passenger Corporation ("Amtrak") to take
over Penn Central's passenger lines. The Regional Rail Reorganiza-

tion Act of 1973' (3-R Act) created Consolidated Rail Corporation
("Conrail"), which similarly took over the operations of many freight
carriers. 9 Seeking to stave off more bankruptcies and stem the need
39 See DiscriminatoryState Taxation of Interstate Carriers,S Rep No 91-630, 91st Cong,
1st Sess 3 (1969).
40 See S Rep No 87-445 at 449 (cited in note 30) (reporting that railroads are more heavily taxed than other carriers because of state property tax liability).
41 Id at 487.
42
Id at 485-86.
43
Rail Revitalizationand Regulatory Reform Act of 1975, HR Rep No 94-725, 94th Cong,
1st Sess 78 (1975).
44 S Rep No 87-445 at 486 (cited in note 30) (noting that between 1955 and 1957, railroad
income fell by 53.9 percent, while property tax bills rose by 9.3 percent).
45 US Department of Transportation, The Northeast Problem at 13 (cited in note 31) (observing that, in the mid-1970s, 13 percent of all railroad mileage was owned by railroads that
had filed for bankruptcy).
46 See S Rep No 87-445 at 449-66 (cited in note 30).
47 Pub L No 91-518, 84 Stat 1327. See US Department of Transportation, The Northeast
Problem at 13 (cited in note 31) (discussing Penn Central's decline and Amtrak's assumption
of passenger rail service).
48
Pub L No 93-236, 87 Stat 985, codified at 45 USC § 701 et seq.
49
For evidence that Conrail was intended to take over rail carrier work, see Rail Services
Act of 1975, S 2718, 94th Cong, 1st Sess (Dec 2, 1975), in 121 Cong Rec 38118 (statement of
Sen Vance Hartke).
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for further nationalization, Congress considered more systemic reforms. This culminated in the adoption of the 4-R Act.
2. The purposes and policies of the 4-R Act.
The evolution of § 11501(b) of the 4-R Act reveals a clear concern about the widespread practice of extracting exorbitant taxes
from railroads due to their nonlocal, nonvoting status and the lock-in
effect they face due to the high upfront cost of constructing track."
However, that was not the only concern. Congress did not seek to
provide railroads protection at all costs, such as by treating them as
most-preferred taxpayers and categorically infringing upon the
states' right to use their tax systems as a means of obtaining certain
valid policy goals. 1 Instead, the Act engaged in a careful balancing of
these competing concerns. The current approaches to subsection
(b)(4), unfortunately, fail to appreciate this balancing and, in doing
so, undermine both goals.
a) Declaration of policy. In its statement of purpose, Con-

gress noted that the 4-R Act was intended, among other things, "to
restore the financial stability of the railway system" and "to promote
the revitalization of such railway system, so that this mode of transportation will remain viable in the private sector."'2
The statement of policy provides further insight into the concerns underlying the adoption of § 11501(b)(4). In particular,
Congress noted that the Act should "balance the needs of carriers,
shippers, and the public"'3 and "foster competition among all carriers
by railroad and other modes of transportation, to promote more adequate and efficient transportation services, and to increase the attractiveness of investing in railroads and rail-service-related enterprises. '

See, for example, S Rep No 91-630 at 3 (cited in note 39).
51 See, for example, id at 4 (citing a letter sent to the Senate Committee on Commerce by
the Department of Transportation acknowledging the need for legislation proscribing discriminatory taxes, but noting that considerations including "[flederal involvement in matters of
State and local concern, tax revenue loss, and the possible impairment of other valid State policies ought to be given weight"); Discriminatory State Taxation of Interstate Carriers, S 2289,
91st Cong, 2d Sess (May 29, 1969), in 116 Cong Rec 2023-24 (Jan 30, 1970) (statement of Sen
Clifford Hansen) (emphasizing that "we must be careful not to discourage those states who for
good and proper reasons establish different classifications of property"); HR Rep No 94-725 at
77-78 (cited in note 43) (observing that relief under the 4-R Act would require balancing the
interest of the railroad in obtaining relief against the interest of the community in maintaining
its tax structure).
52 45 USC § 801(a).
53 45 USC § 801(b)(1).
54 45 USC § 801(b)(2).
50
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Although these broad statements are not terribly enlightening,
they do establish that the 4-R Act was not designed to operate purely as a method for subsidizing railroads by transforming them into
most-preferred taxpayers. Rather, Congress had more nuanced aims
and sought to enhance the overall public good by promoting competition among all modes of transportation. Of course, the Act makes
clear that a vibrant rail industry is a critical component of such
competition; nevertheless, it is a means to an end rather than the end
itself. And while the enunciation of certain bright-line rules in the
4-R Act indicates a congressional determination as to how this public
interest is best advanced in particular circumstances, a court must
carefully consider whether those rules will achieve this broader public purpose before importing them into other provisions that lack
such clear direction.5
b) Statements and reports. The legislative history of the 4-R

Act further indicates that, although protecting railroads was the motivating purpose of the Act, the means adopted to accomplish this
end were narrowly crafted so as to minimize intrusion upon state taxing prerogatives and to prevent making railroads most preferred
taxpayers. This is most clearly displayed by Senator Clifford Hansen,
who proposed the amendment that exempted agricultural, nonindustrial, and noncommercial property from the comparison class applicable to subsections (b)(1)-(3). As he noted in proposing the
amendment, which was later adopted, "we must be careful not to
discourage those states who for good and proper reasons establish
different classifications of property."'6 It is not differences alone that
matter, but reasons. While Congress provided clear rules for determining areas where no state justification could vindicate differential
treatment (such as the formula defining what constitutes discriminatory property valuation), it declined to do so with respect to subsection (b)(4)- the only tax discrimination provision in which Congress
declined to provide a comparison class. This omission, therefore, can
best be interpreted as delegating to courts the responsibility of assessing state justifications in light of the purposes of the Act, an especially appropriate decision considering the broad range of taxes
that subsection (b)(4) covers."

55
Indeed, insofar as Congress provided clear guidance with respect to the appropriate
comparison class under subsections (b)(1)-(3), the omission of a comparison class from subsection (b)(4) provides strong evidence that the omission was intentional. See Part III.A. The
failure of the current approaches to further this policy confirms this intuition. See Part III.B.
56
116 Cong Rec at 2023-24 (statement of Sen Hansen) (cited in note 51).
57
See notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
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At the same time, however, protecting railroads from the states
was a primary motivation of the legislation. The House Report
accompanying the bill cited research demonstrating that railroads
were overtaxed by at least $50 million per year." The Report also
noted the procedural hurdles railroads faced in bringing a claim of
discriminatory taxation: because the Tax Injunction Act59 denies federal courts the ability to enjoin state taxes when an adequate remedy
is available in state courts, railroads were frequently forced to litigate
their claims at the state level." But state law typically requires bringing a complaint against the tax collecting, rather than the tax
assessing, body; since taxes are collected at the county level, this requires numerous suits to challenge a single state tax. Indeed, "[t]he
Southern Pacific... had to bring 48 separate suits in 48 separate California courts to challenge the level of assessments of that railroad's
property." 1 The House concluded that "[i]n view of the generally
poor economic condition of the railroad industry and the effect such
economic hardship is having on the ability of the industry to
adequately serve our national rail transportation needs, the Committee believes discriminatory property and 'in lieu' taxation should
be ended."'
Similarly, the Senate acknowledged the politically vulnerable
position of railroads in justifying legislative action: "Railroads ...are
nonvoting, often nonresident, targets for local taxation, and cannot
easily remove their right-of-way and terminals."' This problem was
exacerbated by industrial decline in the Northeast, which left communities increasingly dependent upon tax revenues from the dwindling ranks of remaining businesses.' Combined with shrinking revenues, railroads found themselves squeezed from both ends.'
This concern was moderated, however, by an acknowledgment
that states might have sound economic or policy reasons for differentiating between railroads and other taxpayers.' The House was careful
to note that the 4-R Act would not provide railroads with an
58 HR Rep No 94-725 at 78 (cited in note 43). It is not clear why this number differentiates so drastically from the $140 million figure cited in the Doyle Report. See text accompanying note 41. Notwithstanding these disparate quantitative measures, the fact of overtaxation is
not disputed.
59 Act of June 25, 1948, ch 646, 62 Stat 932, codified at 28 USC § 1341.
60 28 USC § 1341.
61 HR Rep No 94-725 at 77 (cited in note 43).
62

Id at 78.

63

S Rep No 91-630 at 3 (cited in note 39).
Rail Services Act of 1975, S Rep No 94-499, 94th Cong, 1st Sess 4 (1975).
121 Cong Rec at 38118 (statement of Sen Hartke) (cited in note 49).
116 Cong Rec at 2023-24 (statement of Sen Hansen) (cited in note 51).

64
65
66
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exemption from taxation.' Not only would the burden of proving
discrimination fall on railroads, but "[f]ederal courts [would] be able
to devise remedies that [would] not be burdensome to the communities involved."' Importantly, enjoining the discriminatory tax was not
a foregone conclusion.'
The Senate version of the bill also reflected purposes beyond
protecting railroads. This bill contained an explicit exemption to the
antidiscrimination provision for states that, at the time of the law's
enactment, had provisions in their constitution affording "reasonable
classification of property."'" The conference committee dropped this
exemption," but it nevertheless serves to highlight the measured and
prudent approach Congress took in drafting § 11501(b). '
This is not to say that these concerns dominated the formulation
of the 4-R Act. As courts attempt to resolve the ambiguities in the
4-R Act's text, however, they must remember that Congress
designed the legislation to balance a number of policy considerations
and not simply to protect railroads from discriminatory taxation at
all costs.
3. The early proposals and the addition of subsection (b)(4).
The problem of discriminatory overtaxation by states was first
raised in the Doyle Report, which documented and quantified the
pervasive practice." To combat this problem, the Doyle Report recommended adopting legislation proposed by the Association of
American Railroads.' This proposal, which only barred differentials
in property assessments and levies upon those assessments, is largely
maintained in § 11501(b)(1)-(2). It made no mention of discriminatory ad valorem taxes or other, nonproperty taxes, leaving states
substantial discretion in these realms.
Subsequent iterations of the proposal incorporated prohibitions
on discriminatory ad valorem taxes of the type now codified in
67

See HR Rep No 94-725 at 77-78 (cited in note 43).

68

Id at 77-78.

69

Id at 78.

S Rep No 94-499 at 233 (cited in note 64).
71 See Joseph A. Laronge, Property Tax Exemptions under Section 306 of the 4-R Act, 26
Willamette L Rev 635, 651-52 (1990).
72 The Senate version contained two key restrictions on the tax provisions: the "subject
to a property tax" limitation on the comparison class and the constitutional classification
exception. The House version contained neither qualification. The compromise reached in the
conference committee resulted in the inclusion of the "subject to a property tax" limitation but
the exclusion of the constitutional classification exception. See id.
73 See S Rep No 87-445 at 449-66 (cited in note 30).
74 See id at 465-66.
70
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§ 11501(b)(3). '5 However, it was only several months before passage
of the 4-R Act that a prohibition on nonproperty tax discrimination
was proposed.7 Although the text of the bill itself referred to "any
other tax which results in discriminatory treatment of a carrier by
railroad, 7 1 the House report accompanying the proposal indicated
that its operation was limited to in-lieu taxes." The conference committee report similarly indicated a more
limited scope for the seem7
ingly expansive term "any other tax.
As a result of this incongruity between the text of the statute
and the legislative history, it was unclear for several decades whether
the scope of the provision was as expansive as its plain language suggested or if it was limited to levies designed to offset the loss in
property taxes due to the preceding three subsections of the Act. It
was only with the intervention of the Supreme Court, in CSX Transportation, Inc v Alabama Department of Revenue,' that it was decisively resolved that subsection (b)(4) applied to all nonproperty
taxes." However, many lower courts prior to the CSX decision had

already assumed that subsection (b)(4) applied more broadly than
just in-lieu taxes, albeit based on anticircumvention principles rather
than on the scope of the term "another tax."82 It is not clear if the
CSX decision forecloses this anticircumvention analysis or simply
clarifies what the lower courts had already held. It therefore remains

to be seen whether lower courts will invoke subsection (b)(4) to
75 See Discriminatory Taxation of Common Carriers, S 927, 90th Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 8,
1967), in 113 Cong Rec 2909-10; S 2289, 116 Cong Rec at 2023 (cited in note 51); HR 11207,
92d Cong, 1st Sess (Oct 13, 1971), in 117 Cong Rec 36080; HR 11824, 92d Cong, 1st Sess (Nov
17, 1971), in 117 Cong Rec 41871.
76 Hearingson Legislation Relating to Rail PassengerService before the Subcommittee on
Surface Transportationof the Committee on Commerce, 94th Cong, 1st Sess 1837 (1975) (testimony of Stephen Ailes, President, Association of American Railroads) (proposing a prohibition "against taxes that are in lieu of discriminatory property taxes that are covered by the first
three prohibitions" in the bill).
77
HR Rep No 94-725 at 19 (cited in note 43).
78
Id at 113. An in-lieu tax is one that is passed as a substitute for a prohibited tax, designed to offset the losses from the latter levy. See Black's Law Dictionary at 1594 (cited in
note 18).
79
See Laronge, 26 Willamette L Rev at 658-59 (cited in note 71) (noting that both the
House and Senate bills employed the phrase "any other tax," but that the conference committee report referred to language from the House bill as prohibiting in-lieu taxes).
80
131 S Ct 1101 (2011).
81 See id at 1107-08.
82 See, for example, Kansas City Southern Railway Co v McNamara, 817 F2d 368, 373
(5th Cir 1987) (noting that subsection (b)(4) was included "to ensure that states did not shift to
new forms of tax discrimination outside the letter of the first three subsections"); Richmond,
Fredericksburg& Potomac RailroadCo v Departmentof Taxation, Commonwealth of Virginia,
762 F2d 375, 379 (4th Cir 1985); Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway v Bair,338 NW2d 338,
345 (Iowa 1983).
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strike down all discriminatory nonproperty taxes-however the
comparison class issue is resolved-or only those which appear to be
employed by states pretextually to circumvent the proscriptions of
subsections (b)(1)-(3).
4. The subsequent legislation modeled on 49 USC § 11501(b).
The 4-R Act was part of a broader trend toward deregulation of
the transportation industry that occurred in the late 1970s and early
1980s. Following the implementation of the Act, Congress passed the
Motor Carrier Act of 1980, which deregulated the trucking industry,
and the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982," which deregulated the airline industry.
Both of these statutes contain language tracking that of
§ 11501(b).' There is, however, one important exception: they contain no analogue to subsection (b)(4). As such, these provisions contain no bar to discriminatory taxation against trucking or air interests
outside the context of property taxes. This lends further support to
the proposition that subsection (b)(4) dealt with a fundamentally different type of problem than subsections (b)(1)-(3). As such, it merits
a different analytical approach.
C.

The Judicial Interpretation of 49 USC § 11501(b)

The Supreme Court has decided two major cases that might inform the reading of § 11501(b)(4). First, in ACF Industries, the Court
considered a property tax exemption that applied to motor carriers
but not to railroads.' ACF conceded that the tax could not violate
subsection (b)(3); that subsection specifically applies the "commercial and industrial property" comparison class, and since the motor
carrier was not subject to the property tax levy, it did not fall within

Pub L No 96-296, 94 Stat 793.
Pub L No 97-248, 96 Stat 671.
Compare the language of the 4-R Act, 49 USC § 11501(b)(3) (prohibiting "levy[ing] or
collect[ing] an ad valorem property tax on rail transportation property at a tax rate that exceeds the tax rate applicable to commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction"), with the language in the Motor Carrier Act, 49 USC § 14502(b) (barring a state
from "[l]evy[ing] or collect[ing] an ad valorem property tax on motor carrier transportation
property at a tax rate that exceeds the tax rate applicable to commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction") and the Airport and Airway Improvement Act, 49
USC § 40116(d)(2)(A) (barring a state "levy[ing] or collect[ing] an ad valorem property tax on
air carrier transportation property at a tax rate greater than the tax rate applicable to commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction").
86 See ACF Industries,510 US at 335.
83

84
85
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the comparison class.87 The railroad instead argued that subsection
(b)(4), which did not specifically mention a comparison class and
therefore did not necessarily exclude fully exempt property,
nevertheless operated to invalidate the tax. The Court conceded that
the operation of subsections (b)(1)-(3) created an anomaly: states
could avoid violating the 4-R Act by fully exempting property from a
given tax (effectively charging a 0 percent tax rate), but partial exemptions (say, charging a 2 percent tax rate when railroads pay a 4
percent tax rate) would constitute discrimination. It nevertheless
concluded that subsection (b)(4) could not be read to invalidate a tax
that would otherwise be permissible under the preceding provisions.'
Otherwise, it would subvert the specific exemptions provided for in
the Act, such as those for agricultural and timber property. More
generally, the Court noted that federalism concerns "compel" the
Court to avoid reading a limitation on state taxing authority more
broadly than its express terms demand, even if it leads to such an
anomalous consequence." Because the taxing authority is central to
state sovereignty, federal laws will only be read to preempt that authority "if that result is 'the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'" When ambiguities exist, deference must be shown to the
states.
The Supreme Court revisited § 11501(b) in CSX Transportation.
In this case, CSX challenged an Alabama sales and use tax from
which its main competitors were exempt.91 The Court first acknowledged the holding in ACF Industries that subsection (b)(4) does not
apply to property taxes, which are covered exclusively by subsections
(b)(1)-(3). The Court, however, also found that subsection (b)(4)
does apply to all other types of tax, and not simply in-lieu taxes, as
some lower courts had concluded.' The Court also noted that the
ACF Industries Court's ruling permitting full exemptions from property taxes might not apply in the nonproperty tax context. The only
reason such full exemptions were permitted with respect to property
taxes is because the "commercial and industrial" comparison class
definition explicitly limited its scope to properties "subject to a property tax levy."' Because the full exemption was not from a property
87 The statute defines "commercial and industrial property" as "property ... subject to a
property tax levy." 49 USC § 11501(a)(4).
88 See A CF Industries,510 US at 342.
89 See id at 345.
90 Id (quotation marks omitted).
91 See CSX Transportation,131 S Ct at 1104-05.
92 See id at 1107. See also notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
93 CSX Transportation,131 S Ct at 1111, quoting § 11501(a)(4) (emphasis added).
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tax, but a sales and use tax, the competitor was not brought outside
the ambit of § 11501(b). '
Importantly, however, the Court emphasized that this would not
make railroads most-preferred taxpayers, eligible for any tax break
that any other business received." This is because, discrimination not
being otherwise defined in the context of subsection (b)(4), the
"ordinary meaning" of the term must control. ' As such, a full exemption would provide only prima facie evidence of discrimination,
which the state could rebut if it could offer sufficient justification for
declining to provide the exemption to rail carriersY In the immediate
case, the Court only determined that the tax might discriminate and
remanded the case without determining the appropriate comparison
class for subsection (b)(4) claims."

In passing the 4-R Act, Congress's primary goal was to ensure
railroads' financial sustainability by preventing tax discrimination
against them. But this was not its only goal. Rather, Congress recognized that competition within the transportation industry was critical,
and it was therefore careful not to make railroads most-preferred
taxpayers. Moreover, it recognized that states might have valid policy reasons for applying differential taxes and sought to provide them
room to exercise their traditional taxing prerogatives.
Additionally, the primary type of tax discrimination that Congress sought to end was discriminatory property taxation of the sort
addressed in subsections (b)(1)-(3). Although subsection (b)(4) operates to prohibit other types of discriminatory taxes, in light of the
foregoing considerations, this ought not be read as providing the
same categorical proscription of any differences in tax treatment. As
such, the most plausible interpretation of subsection (b)(4) provides
greater flexibility to the states than is found in subsections
(b)(1)-(3), where, for example, specific comparison classes and definitions of discrimination are provided.

95
96

See id at 1111.
See id at 1109 n 8.
See id at 1107.

97
98

See CSX Transportation,131 S Ct at 1109 n 8.
See id at 1114.

94
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II. COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS OF 49 USC § 11501(b)(4)
Courts have developed two general solutions to the comparison
class problem. The dominant view, adopted by all but one federal
circuit court to consider the matter, is the functional approach.
Drawing upon subsections (b)(1)-(3), this approach advocates using
a "commercial and industrial" comparison class to assess allegedly
discriminatory nonproperty taxes under subsection (b)(4). In contrast, several other courts have adopted the competitive approach,
which compares railroads' tax treatment to that of their competitors.
Minor variations have also been proposed but have not attracted
broad support from other courts."
An important point to note at the outset is that the courts adopting these various approaches have found tax differences between
railroads and their comparison classes to constitute virtually per se
discrimination. Although courts permit de minimis variations within
a class, they do not inquire into the reasons explaining differential
treatment.
A. The Functional Approach
The majority of courts have adopted the functional approach,
which holds that taxes alleged to violate subsection (b)(4) should be
compared to a class of other commercial and industrial interests.
Generally speaking, courts adopting this approach argue that it is
most consistent with the broader text of the statute, which employs
such a comparison class in the other provisions of § 11501(b). They
also contend that this comparison class protects against the risk of
discrimination against nonlocal firms by tying railroads' fate to that
of a large and local group of businesses.
The functional approach was first adopted by the Fifth Circuit in
Kansas City Southern Railway Co v McNamara. ' There, the court
invalidated a gross receipts tax that applied only to "public utilities,"
a classification that included railroads, motor bus lines, motor freight
lines, express companies, boat or packet lines, and pipe lines. '°' Rejecting the state's argument that its tax could not violate the 4-R Act
because it ensured the ability of railroads to compete on an even
footing with other carriers, the court stressed that the comparison

99 See, for example, Kansas City Southern Railway Co v Koeller, 653 F3d 496, 508 (7th
Cir 2011) (explaining that a "universal approach," comparing railroads to all other taxpayers,
has not received the endorsement of any court).
100817 F2d 368 (5th Cir 1987).
101 Id at 374.
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class must comprise a sufficient number of local taxpayers so as to
protect against unfair distribution of the tax burden. In this case, the
class of taxpayers was "simply too small and too foreign" to fulfill
this function."'
The court, however, hedged its view. It noted that, although the
4-R Act is a prophylactic that precludes even ostensibly fair differentiation, there might be circumstances in which the state can justify a
smaller tax class based on the nature of the tax and on a direct
relationship between the tax and benefits limited to the class, such
that railroads are not cross-subsidizing other taxpayers. °3 It also
noted special concerns that might arise when a type of tax, by its very
nature, can only apply to railroads or a similarly limited group."
Thus, the court left some flexibility to tweak the comparison class
based upon the unique facts of a given case.
The Ninth Circuit cited McNamara in adopting the functional
approach in Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co v Arizona."
However, whereas McNamara struck down a tax that applied exclusively to railroads and their competitors, the Ninth Circuit used the
functional approach to uphold transaction privilege and use taxes
applicable to seventeen classes of commercial and industrial businesses, including railroads but excluding motor carriers.' ' Satisfied
that the railroads' tax burden was tied to a large and local group of
taxpayers, the court worried that finding liability due to the exemption for competitors might turn railroads into most-preferred taxpayers,"" eligible for every tax break that any other transportation
company received.' ' Because 82 percent of local business classes
were subject to the tax, the 4-R Act was not violated."'
The Seventh Circuit has also endorsed the functional approach,
albeit somewhat tentatively. In Kansas City Southern Railway Co v
Koeller,"' the court considered a tax imposed on landowners within a

Id at 375.
See id.
104 See McNamara, 817 F2d at 376.
105 78 F3d 438, 441 (9th Cir 1996).
106 See id at 443-44.
107 See id at 442.
108 The court also noted that a contrary rule would be inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's holding in ACF Industries, which permitted full exemptions in § 11501(b)(3) cases. Id
at 442-43. The Court's holding in CSX Transportation,however, has cast doubt on ACF Industries's applicability to § 11501(b)(4) claims. See text accompanying notes 91-98.
109 See Arizona, 78 F3d at 443.
110 653 F3d 496 (7th Cir 2011).
102
103
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flooding zone in order to fund a levee and drainage system."' While
most commercial and industrial properties paid the tax on a per-acre
basis, railroads, pipelines, and utilities were assessed on a "benefit"
basis, resulting in massive disparities in total tax burden between the
two classes."2 The court echoed many of the arguments made by earlier courts concerning the textual justification for the functional approach and the importance of ensuring that railroads' interests have
political representation. The court also noted, however, that because
the railroad was the only common carrier within the taxing district, a
competitive
approach
would
have
been
without
content.' Again, the court noted that different facts might call for a
different rule in a future case."'
B.

The Competitive Approach

Although only one federal circuit court has adopted the competitive approach, which directs courts to compare allegedly discriminatory taxes to those applicable to railroads' main competitors,
this approach has also been endorsed by at least two states'
highest courts."'
The courts endorsing the competitive approach contend that the
goal of ensuring railroads' financial stability is furthered by protecting their ability to compete on an even footing, which is best
achieved by comparing how an allegedly discriminatory tax affects
railroads as compared to their main competitors. However, as with
the courts adopting the functional approach, these courts have displayed a reluctance to establish a bright-line rule, leaving themselves
substantial room to take a different tack should different factual
circumstances arise.
In Burlington Northern, Santa Fe Railway Co v Lohman,"' the
Eighth Circuit considered a general sales and use tax on diesel fuel

n1 Although only levied on landowners, this tax did not fall within § 11501(b)(1)-(3)
because the amount of the tax was unrelated to the property's value and was not imposed in an
ad valorem manner. See Koeller, 653 F3d at 510-12.
112 See id at 502 (noting that the two railroads paid annual assessments of $85,545 and
$93,920 under the new regime, whereas they would have paid only $3,898 and $2,578, respectively, under the per-acre regime).
113 See id at 509-10 (observing that the presence of fourteen other commercial and industrial
entities provides a comparison class sufficiently large to ensure local political representation).
114 See id at 509.
115 See Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co v Bair, 338 NW2d 338, 346 (Iowa
1983); Burlington Northern Railroad Co v Commissioner of Revenue, 509 NW2d 551, 553
(Minn 1993).
116 193 F3d 984 (8th Cir 1999).
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from which trucks and barges were exempt."' The court expressed
concern that a "commercial and industrial" comparison class would
undermine the purpose of the 4-R Act by allowing states to impose
taxes that frustrate railroads' ability to compete. For instance, a strategic legislature could still favor motor carriers over railroads if
enough unrelated commercial organizations also had to pay the tax."'
At the same time, however, the court noted that "the comparison
class should be appropriate to the type of tax and discrimination
challenged in a particular case," indicating that the competitive approach
might yield to a different comparison class under different facts."9
The Iowa Supreme Court has apparently also adopted the competitive approach. In Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co v
2" the court struck down an excise tax on fuel that did not apply
Bair,'

to trucks, barges, and aircraft. However, the reasoning in this case
was more equivocal: because a fuel tax was at issue, and because
many commercial and industrial taxpayers do not use fuel in the ordinary course of business, it would not make sense to apply the functional approach.'2' The implication, of course, is that the comparison
class might adjust based on the nature of the tax at issue.
Finally, the Minnesota Supreme Court also employed the competitive approach in addressing a state sales and use tax on rolling
stock from which airlines and barges were exempt. In Burlington
Northern Railroad Co v Commissioner of Revenue,'2 the court inval-

idated the tax, distinguishing McNamara on the ground that, in this
case, there was a blanket tax from which competitors were exempt,
as opposed to a general tax of limited scope.'" In essence, the court
seemed to be concerned about the possibility of states circumventing
the spirit of the 4-R Act by strategically employing tax exemptions to
benefit favored businesses, indicating that a contrary rule might govern absent such dubious legislative motives.'4

117 See id at 985. Although trucks paid a similar tax at the pump, from which railroads
were obviously exempt, barges paid no analogous fuel tax. Id.
118 See id at 986 (noting that a railroad could still be placed at a competitive disadvantage
if "too broad a comparison class is chosen" because railroads could remain "subject to a
generally imposed nonproperty tax, while their direct competitors are not).
119 Id.
120 338 NW2d 338 (Iowa 1983).
121 Id at 346.
122 509 NW2d 551 (Minn 1993).

123 Id at 553.
124

See note 108.
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None of the courts that has addressed the question of which
comparison class to apply in assessing § 11501(b)(4) claims have provided a firm and fixed answer. Rather, they have preferred to reserve
the right to reconsider the proper comparison class as different fact
patterns arise. This reflects both a recognition that there are reasonable grounds for a state to differentiate between railroads and other
taxpayers and a reluctance to endorse a single, fixed comparison
class to govern all cases, especially in light of the virtually per se invalidity that accompanies disparities in tax treatment between railroads and the selected comparison class.
Arguments for the functional approach tend to rely on the textual argument that the "commercial and industrial" comparison class
employed in subsections (b)(1)-(3) should logically fill the gap in
subsection (b)(4), as well as the policy argument contending that this
is the best way to ensure railroads have proper political representation without making them most-preferred taxpayers. The competitive approach would not adequately protect railroads in the event
that their competitors were also small and foreign, in which case all
transportation firms could be discriminated against in violation of
the spirit of the 4-R Act. Moreover, these courts recognized the need
for some differentiation among taxpayers and expressed concern
that the small comparison class would effectively force states to offer
railroads any tax exemption available to any of their competitors.
The competitive approach, on the other hand, is typically
employed in assessing generally applicable taxes from which railroads' competitors are exempt. Either explicitly or implicitly, courts
in these cases expressed concern about states circumventing the 4-R
Act's purpose of ensuring that railroads can compete effectively in
the private sector.
III. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CURRENT APPROACHES

The approaches discussed above fail to provide a satisfying solution to the problem posed by the omission of a comparison class
from § 11501(b)(4). The textual arguments that courts have asserted
are unpersuasive, and both approaches fail to adequately balance the
twin policies of the 4-R Act: ensuring railroads' competitiveness and
protecting states' autonomy in crafting their tax systems. Indeed, the
pronounced differences in the type and breadth of taxes addressed
by subsections (b)(1)-(3) and (b)(4) provide substantial reason to
question whether Congress intended the rigid comparison-class
analysis applied to the former to be extended to cover the latter, as well.
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A. The Text of the Statute Does Not Support Either Approach
As noted above, proponents of each of the current approaches
have advanced textual arguments for their preferred comparison
class. Ultimately, however, these arguments are predicated on the
unquestioned assumption that some comparison class must govern
subsection (b)(4). This assumption has blinded these courts to the
most sensible inference to draw from the text: no comparison class
governs these claims.
1. The functional approach.
The key textual argument supporting the functional approach
is that the commercial and industrial comparison class is the only
one that appears elsewhere in the statute. If Congress explicitly provided for that comparison class to govern every other antidiscrimination provision, it is logical to use the same class to fill the gap in
subsection (b)(4). "
Advocates for the competitive approach have an easy answer. In
light of the inclusion of the commercial and industrial comparison
class in the preceding three subsections, its exclusion from subsection
(b)(4) must be read to imply that this class does not apply to subsection (b)(4) claims.12" Indeed, Congress
clearly knew how to provide
27
so.
do
to
wanted
it
had
for that class
While this argument itself seems fatal to the functional approach,
there are still further difficulties squaring the approach with the text of
the statute. Notably, the comparison class includes only commercial
and industrial property "subject to a property tax levy."' " First, this indicates that Congress was thinking first and foremost about property
taxes when it wrote the comparison class, not the nonproperty taxes
covered by subsection (b)(4). Second, it is hard to understand what it
would mean to exclude from a comparison class for nonproperty tax
purposes those taxpayers not subject to a property tax levy. Indeed,
the Supreme Court in CSX Transportationhinted at the oddity of this
125
126
127

See, for example, Koeller, 653 F3d at 509.
See, for example, Lohman, 193 F3d at 985-86.
See Meghrig v KFC Western, Inc, 516 US 479, 485 (1996) (comparing the overlapping

scope of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act but noting that the absence of a remedy for recovery of cleanup costs in the latter, when present in the former, leads to the presumption that no such remedy exists in the latter); Lehman v Nakshian, 453 US 156, 162 (1981)
(contrasting a provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 explicitly
providing for a jury trial with one that did not and holding that the latter therefore did not
merit a jury).
128 49 USC § 11501(a)(4) (emphasis added).
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construction. Acknowledging that ACF Industries permits full exemptions from property taxes since such property would not be
"subject to a property tax levy," the Court nevertheless mused that
full exemptions from the nonproperty taxes addressed by subsection

(b)(4) might not be permissible, since the provision only explicitly
applies to property taxes."' If that is the case, we are left with two
possibilities for interpreting the role of this qualifying term in subsection (b)(4) claims. First, it could be neglected, in which case the qualifier is rendered wholly superfluous. Alternatively, it could limit the
comparison class, with the absurd consequence of excluding from a
comparison class for nonproperty tax purposes those taxpayers not
subject to an entirely different tax. Either option requires engaging
in tenuous textual contortions to arrive at an imperfect answer to the
comparison class question, and should not be pursued when a better
solution exists.
2. The competitive approach.
Courts adopting the competitive approach have not advanced a
strong textual argument for their preferred comparison class. Instead, these courts reject the functional approach's textual arguments
only to settle on a class of competitors, as if this were the only possible alternative solution. Of course, if the deficiency with the functional approach stems from the omission of the commercial and industrial class provided for elsewhere in the statute, it is difficult to
see how the application of a wholly extratextual comparison class,
which no part of the statute even hints at, could provide a more
coherent solution.
These courts began with the assumption that some comparison
class must apply to subsection (b)(4) claims and thus proceeded to
twist the language of the statute to justify their preferred approach.
The disappointing results of this endeavor demand reexamination of
their assumptions. As the dissent in Arizona observed, "I refuse to
provide for an exclusive comparison class under [§ 11501(b)(4)]
when Congress explicitly chose not to.''3

B.

The Policies of the 4-R Act Are Not Adequately Balanced by
the Current Approaches

The 4-R Act sought to strike a balance that protected railroads
from discriminatory taxation while preserving the states' power to
129

See CSX Transportation,131 S Ct at 1111.

130 Arizona, 78 F3d at 445 (Nielsen dissenting).
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tax. The principle is easier to state than to apply: although it is easy
to say that these were competing concerns, that does not illuminate
how to resolve concrete problems of interpretation or how to measure trade-offs between the two. Nevertheless, all of the proposed
approaches to this split of authorities present a serious potential for
both circumvention and unduly restrictive constraints on the state
taxing power.
There are compelling reasons, moreover, to suppose that whatever logic motivated Congress to adopt the balance it struck in
subsections (b)(1)-(3), this logic is not readily transferable to subsection (b)(4). The general approach that Congress took in the property
tax context was one of bright-line rules barring any differentials between the railroads and other commercial and industrial taxpayers.
While this might be sensible in the context of property taxes, either
due to the nature of property or the defined world of possible revenue sources affected, extending this approach into the broader and
more varied world of taxes covered by subsection (b)(4) -including
any and every nonproperty tax-has broad implications that drastically alter the scope and effect of the 4-R Act's proscription of tax
discrimination.
1. The protection of railroads.
The 4-R Act was designed to put an end to overtaxation of railroads by the states. This was accomplished in subsections (b)(1)-(3)
through the use of clear rules for assessing whether a property tax
discriminated, including a means by which to measure the value of
property and an allocation of the burdens of proof. Subsection (b)(4)
was designed at the very least to prevent circumvention of the preceding provisions and has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as
providing even broader protection by prohibiting discrimination with
regard to all other types of taxes. 3 '
The fixed comparison class approaches-the functional and
competitive approaches-allow for easy circumvention by legislatures, however. A brief survey of the cases reveals how artfully crafted laws can accomplish the same impermissible ends that the rest of
§ 11501(b) aims to foreclose.
Take Arizona, for example, the case in which the Ninth Circuit
upheld two taxes that applied to railroads but from which their main
competitors were exempt. The court reasoned that because the
number of other commercial and industrial taxpayers subject to the
131

CSX Transportation,131 S Ct at 1107.
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challenged tax was "so large that the Taxing Authorities [could not]
provide an exact number,.' 32 the tax fate of railroads was tied to that
of a sufficiently large and local group of taxpayers so as to protect
them against discrimination. This statement, however, highlights a
flawed premise of the functional approach. Those subject to the tax
were large and diffuse, whereas the other carriers who received an
exemption were small and concentrated.'33 These small and concentrated competitors will have greater political influence in the state,
and their low coordination costs will make it easier for them to lobby
state legislatures for laws that put competing railroads at a disadvantage.'" This classic case of interest group politicking nevertheless
evades the strictures of the 4-R Act as construed under the functional approach, thus presenting a serious challenge to protecting the
financial sustainability of railroads by upholding taxes that apply to
most commercial and industrial taxpayers, even when those actually
within railroads' market are exempt.
The competitive approach, meanwhile, fails to account for the
possibility that railroads will have no competitors to which the tax
might apply. Koeller provides a fitting example. There, the challenged tax was for the maintenance of a levee and drainage system to
mitigate flooding of a nearby river. Although this was a tax on the
benefit obtained from the system rather than a property tax, it was
levied on nearby landowners in proportion to the estimated benefits
the levee would provide to them. The court adopted the functional
approach, acknowledging that the competitive approach would be
unhelpful due to the lack of competitors who owned land in the relevant taxing area and were thus subject to the tax.
Burlington Northern Railroad Co v City of Superior,Wisconsin'

provides a variant on this theme. In that case, the tax pertained to
the operation of iron-ore-concentrate docks, all of which were
owned and operated by railroads." While the court struck down the
132 Arizona, 78 F3d at 443.
133 Id at 439 n 2, 443 (noting that the 140,000 taxpayers subject to the tax operated across
seventeen classifications of business activities, including retail sales, mining, and membership
camping).
134 Mancur Olson Jr, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of
Groups 53-57 (Harvard 1965). Even assuming that railroads are capable of organizing to receive an exemption as well, this does not remedy the key conceptual hole in the functional approach's argument. Requiring only that railroads be compared to a large and local group of
taxpayers does little to protect against unfavorable treatment in a political sphere dominated
by small and organized interest groups. Indeed, this approach effectively requires resort to the
state political system-a result inconsistent with the federal legislation.
135932 F2d 1185 (7th Cir 1991).
136 Id at 1186.
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tax in this case, it appears likely that the competitive approach would
not yield the same result.
In both variants of the competitive approach, the lack of discrimination vis-A-vis competitors could sustain the taxes notwithstanding the clear way in which the laws exploit the railroads' large
and immobile investment to extract taxes that they cannot procure
from other sources. By isolating a particular market or activity in
which railroads have no competitors, a legislature could circumvent
the proscriptions of § 11501(b) and, in doing so, undermine the financial sustainability of railroads.
One might argue that the courts could adopt a competitive approach as a general rule but employ the functional approach when
the lack of any competitors renders the default rule inappropriate.
Indeed, this appears to be the approach endorsed by the Arizona
dissent.'37 While this hybrid approach is an improvement upon the
pure competitive and pure functional approaches, it also introduces
uncertainty while maintaining a degree of ham-handedness in the
application of the statute. It does so by replacing an analysis of the
facts surrounding the imposition of an allegedly discriminatory tax
with a set of proxies-How many taxpayers are subject to the tax?
Does the number of taxpayers subject to the tax represent a "singling
out" of railroads? -that imperfectly capture the truly relevant considerations, such as the extent to which a tax exploits the railroads'
immobility or distinguishes between railroads and other taxpayers
without a rational ground for such distinction. Despite the apparent
parsimony of such an approach, its shortcomings when it comes to
separating reasonable disparities from discriminatory ones give cause
for concern.
2.

The protection of states' taxing prerogatives.

While the fixed comparison classes present opportunities for circumvention, they also risk unduly tying legislatures' hands. This is
especially pronounced in cases of market dominance, complementary taxation, and special assessments. While this adverse consequence is not a necessary result of the current approaches, the fixed
nature of the comparison classes renders them a blunt instrument
that amplifies the risk that reasonable distinctions among taxpayers
will be foreclosed under the 4-R Act.
137 See Arizona, 78 F3d at 444-45 (Nielsen dissenting) (arguing that the functional approach should be applied when "the class of taxpayers burdened by the tax [is] 'unnecessarily
small,"' but that when a case "involves a broad tax that exempts the Railroads' primary competitors," the competitive approach is appropriate).
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The problem of market dominance appears when a tax is levied
upon an activity in which only railroads engage. One example of this
is City of Superior, discussed above. Although the dock business was
not a part of the railroad's ordinary business (a point the court did
not consider relevant), the Seventh Circuit nevertheless refused to
consider whether similar taxes were imposed on comparable activities of other businesses. Instead, the court "infer[red] a congressional
desire that courts avoid the thicket of incidence analysis and forbid
states to single out railroads for taxation.., by levying a tax on an
activity in which.., only railroads engage. 138 Rooted in a commonsense intuition that such a deep analysis would be difficult to
administer and adjudge, the effect of this was to foreclose the city
from taxing an otherwise taxable activity because, by happenstance
of the marketplace, only railroads engaged in it.
The complementary tax problem occurs when a tax is levied upon one taxpayer in place of another tax that cannot be levied upon it.
Such regimes typically appear in the case of fuel purchases, as different vehicles purchase fuel in different ways. Despite the seeming
reasonableness of these plans, they are often invalidated under the
4-R Act. 3 ' In Union Pacific Railroad Company v Minnesota Depart-

ment of Revenue,'" the Eighth Circuit invalidated a sales and use tax
on the purchase and consumption of fuel when the tax was imposed
only on railroads and ships, even though motor carriers and air carriers paid an excise tax on such purchases instead."' The court refused
to consider the relative burdens that the complementary taxes imposed on other members of the comparison class, instead finding that
the lower court "should have confined its analysis to only the sales
and use taxes on transportation fuel.....
Finally, differential taxes might be levied in proportion to benefits that accrue solely to the railroads. This problem has not arisen in
the major cases, as infrastructure expenses are typically funded by

City of Superior,932 F2d at 1188.
See, for example, id at 1187-88 (inferring that Congress did not intend for courts to
assess the overall burden of a state's tax system); McNamara, 817 F2d at 377-78 (concluding
that such inquiries are "a paradigm of the kind of polycentric problem for which courts are illsuited"); Lohman, 193 F3d at 986 (concluding that "the actual fairness of those [taxing]
arrangements is too difficult and expensive to evaluate"). See also Alabama Great Southern
Railroad Company v Eagerton, 541 F Supp 1084, 1086 (MD Ala 1982).
140 507 F3d 693 (8th Cir 2007).
141 Id at 696.
142 Id. But see McNamara, 817 F2d at 376 (considering in dicta that in a future case a
complementary tax might be permissible, but that the issue need not be decided because the
tax regime at issue did not impose complementary taxes).
138

139
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railroads directly rather than through taxes.' 3 Nevertheless, following
the trend in the complementary tax cases, courts generally decline to
consider the overall fairness of the tax system and so will not consider whether a higher tax rate on railroads might be justified by a proportionate benefit that railroads receive.'"
In Arizona, for example, the Ninth Circuit held that a tax levied
equally upon railroads and others in the comparison class was valid
even though the other comparison class members received a benefit
back from those tax payments while railroads did not.' The converse
of this, then, should also hold: if railroads are taxed at a higher rate
to compensate for the specific burdens they impose, the in-kind repayment of those tax dollars should not save the tax.'" As such, states
are precluded from either increasing tax revenue in an otherwise
permissible manner or seeking remuneration for those expenses
from the taxpayers imposing the costs.
To be sure, these flaws are not inextricably tied to the current
approaches, and some courts have in other situations shown a
greater willingness to consider the whole tax structure.' 7 But the
fixed comparison class approaches nevertheless diminish the opportunity to draw reasonable distinctions among taxpayers by defining a
fixed subset of taxpayers against whom any differences in tax rates
are presumptively invalid.
As one court observed, "[t]he 4-R Act puts severe limits on the
broad discretion usually afforded state taxing authorities."'" Although
a classification may be "perfectly fair and reasonable," the 4-R Act
"forbids some fair arrangements because the actual fairness of those

143 See, for example, Bair, 338 NW2d at 347 (finding a tax on railroads discriminatory despite an ostensibly lower tax rate as compared to motor carriers because the motor carriers'
taxes went entirely to the maintenance of highways).
144 See, for example, Arizona, 78 F3d at 443 ("The 4-R Act reaches only tax burdens and
not tax benefits."); City of Superior, 932 F2d at 1187 ("The preceding subsections of the statute.., forbid states to tax railroad properties proportionately more heavily than other commercial and industrial property, even if the railroad derives a greater benefit from the public
services defrayed by the cost."); McNamara, 817 F2d at 377 (refusing to assess the basic fairness of a state tax system because "an attempt to make the assessment would be extraordinarily costly both to the parties and the judicial system").
145 Arizona, 78 F3d at 443-44.
146 But see Koeller, 653 F3d at 505-06 (noting the possibility that a special assessment on
railroads for railroad-specific purposes, as opposed to a tax going into general funds, might not
violate § 11501(b)); McNamara, 817 F2d at 375.
147 See City of Superior, 932 F2d at 1188 (summarizing cases in which the Supreme Court
has endorsed an assessment of a state's entire tax structure, but concluding that the rationales
justifying such an inquiry in those cases did not apply to the present circumstances).
148 McNamara, 817 F2d at 375.
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arrangements is too difficult and expensive to evaluate.' '... While this
might be true when faced with a fixed comparison class, an analysis
that starts with a state's classification and simply evaluates whether
there is a reasonable basis for that treatment might reduce the detrimental effects of such prophylaxis while providing more robust
protection for railroads. Although this is a much different approach
from that employed in subsections (b)(1)-(3), consideration of the
differences between property taxes and other taxes indicates that the
approach applicable to the former might not be appropriate when
assessing the disparate and wide-ranging scope of the latter.

The problems outlined above do not arise in every application
of subsection (b)(4); indeed, any of the current approaches will
probably capture a substantial proportion of the discriminatory taxes
that Congress sought to prohibit in § 11501(b). Moreover, these errors will surely occur from time to time in the property tax context as
well, where Congress explicitly provided for a fixed comparison
class. Thus, before we can jettison the general approach used elsewhere in the statute, it is necessary to consider what would justify a
wholesale reconsideration of how to approach claims of nonproperty
tax discrimination.
To start, the text of the statute is inconsistent with both of the
fixed comparison class approaches. 5 ' Advocates of these approaches
relied on the assumption that a fixed comparison class must apply to
subsection (b)(4) claims yet struggled to find a class that made sense in
light of the clear (and, considering subsections (b)(1)-(3), apparently
intentional) omission of such a class from subsection (b)(4). Having
considered the underwhelming effects of these approaches, it appears
increasingly persuasive that the statute means what it says: no comparison class applies to claims brought under subsection (b)(4).
Further, the fact that fixed comparison classes frustrate the purposes of the 4-R Act in regard to property and nonproperty taxes
alike counsels against extending the class beyond the bare minimum
required by the text of the statute. Indeed, in CSX Transportation,
the Supreme Court took just this approach. There, the Court reasoned that the definition of the comparison class as including commercial and industrial taxpayers "subject to a property tax" meant
that full exemptions from property taxes were permitted (as such

149
150

Id at 375.
See Part III.A.
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taxpayers were not "subject to" the tax) but that full exemptions
from nonproperty taxes were not."' Conceding that it was not readily
apparent why the two different types of taxes should receive differthat
ent treatment, the Court nevertheless determined
inconsistency between property and nonproperty taxes was
preferable to extending the anomalies that arose from permitting full
exemptions-but not partial exemptions-in the property tax context. The Court therefore "hesitate[d] to extend the distinction between [permissible] tax exemptions and [impermissible] differential
tax rates in order to avoid a distinction between property and
nonproperty taxes.' 52 This hinged on the fact that allowing full exemptions "would frustrate the purposes of the Act even more than
[differential tax rates]" and would not be assumed absent explicit
textual instruction to do so.'"3
Similarly, the fixed comparison class approaches only apply explicitly to the provisions governing property taxes. Considering the
perverse results that their expansion might create, these approaches
should not be expanded when an alternative exists that is more consistent with the purposes of the Act.
Furthermore, defining a comparison class simply delineates the
groups that a court must compare; it does not tell a court how to determine what differences between those groups give rise to liability
under the Act. For claims brought under subsections (b)(1)-(3), other
provisions of the 4-R Act answer this question. For example, if discriminatory property assessments are alleged, it must then be shown
(with burdens allocated by state law) that the ratio of assessed-tomarket value of railroad property is greater than 5 percent the comparable ratio of nonrailroad property, with property values determined by a sales-assessment-ratio study. If a discriminatory ad valorem tax is alleged, the text of the statute clearly states that any
difference in tax rate gives rise to liability. '" In contrast, the Act does
not provide further elaboration as to what gives rise to liability for
nonproperty tax discrimination. Where Congress provides clear metrics by which courts can measure impermissible discrimination, it
makes sense for Congress also to clearly define a comparison class
within which those formulas should be applied. Where Congress has
not provided any guidance on the content of a discrimination analysis,

151
152
153
154
155

See CSX Transportation,131 S Ct at 1110-12.
Id at 1114.
Id.
49 USC § 11501(c).
49 USC § 11501(b)(3).
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as is the case with respect to subsection (b)(4) claims, insisting upon
a fixed comparison class against which discrimination should be
measured puts the cart before the horse. Congress's decision not to
clearly state what differentials give rise to liability under subsection
(b)(4) most plausibly reflects its recognition that the bright-line rules
adopted for the narrower types of taxes covered by subsections
(b)(1)-(3) are inappropriate for the broad and varied taxes addressed by subsection (b)(4). This same insight counsels against
looking to the preceding subsections for a fixed comparison class to
import into subsection (b)(4).
IV. A STATE-CENTERED APPROACH TO TAX DISCRIMINATION
UNDER

§ 11501(b)(4)

In light of the foregoing discussion, "a serious question [] remain[s] about whether to transplant [the] construction of subsections
(b)(1)-(3) to subsection (b)(4)'s very different terrain.' ' .6 Fortunately, the Supreme Court has provided a helpful clue from which to
craft a workable solution. This solution rejects the assumption adopted by the current approaches that subsection (b)(4) requires a fixed
comparison class. Instead, it suggests that courts should simply evaluate classifications drawn in a state's tax law to determine reasonableness. This approach is consistent with the text, purposes, and judicial
interpretation of the 4-R Act. It also complements analogous areas of
law that, although applicable to tax discrimination claims, have proven
insufficient to address the concerns underlying the 4-R Act.
A. States as Determinants of the Comparison Class
The key to a workable solution lies in shifting courts' focus from
identifying a fixed and immutable comparison class in the sense provided by subsections (b)(1)-(3), to granting states discretion to make
reasonable classifications subject to judicial scrutiny. Under such an
approach, states that classify taxpayers in a way that places undue
burdens upon railroads without any relation to a valid state purpose
would be struck down. When such a distinction is a reasonable
means of pursuing ends beyond discrimination, however-for example, exempting trucks from a sales and use tax on fuel and levying a
pump tax on them instead due to administrative efficiency concerns
or taxing railroads to compensate for the increased burdens they
place on the state-courts should be willing to uphold the tax as
within the realm of discretion that Congress preserved for the states.
156 CSX Transportation,131 S Ct at 1109 n 8.
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This is exactly the approach that the Supreme Court indicated
might govern other aspects of § 11501(b). In CSX Transportation,
the Court responded to concerns that a rule denying states the authority to grant full exemptions from nonproperty taxes would make
railroads most-preferred taxpayers by clarifying that "[w]hether the
railroad will prevail-that is, whether it can prove the alleged discrimination- depends on whether the State offers a sufficient justification for declining to provide the exemption at issue to rail carriers.. 5 This insight picks up on the fact that the statute does not proprovide a clear definition of nonproperty tax discrimination, but
stops short of taking the next logical step by dispensing with the assumed requirement of a fixed comparison class altogether. Once
states are permitted to litigate whether a distinction between taxpayers provides "sufficient justification" for differential tax treatment,
however, the existence of a comparison class serves no discernible
purpose. This is because even the broadest comparison class would
seldom give rise to liability even when facial disparities in tax treatment are rampant, due to the many plausible bases for distinguishing
between railroads and individual members of the comparison class.
For example, differences in the tax treatment of railroads and individual households are almost certain to have sufficient justification
due to the manifest differences between private citizens and corporate common carriers.
Under this conception, then, a prima facie showing of disparate
treatment between railroads and any other taxpayer will shift the
burden to the state to justify the disparity. While one might borrow
from the Equal Protection Clause's tiered-scrutiny analysis to determine how skeptically courts should view purported state justifications, it ultimately must be a question for the courts based on the circumstances of the individual case. This is especially so due to the
varying amounts of political sway that a railroad might have from
state to state.' Indeed, the utility of bright-line distinctions among
levels of scrutiny is open to question even within the Equal Protection context. "9 As such, this state-centered approach is, for better or
worse, a fact-driven exercise: "The question then is whether

157 Id.

See United States v Carolene Products, 304 US 144, 153 n 4 (1938).
See Craig v Boren, 429 US 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens concurring) (contending that the
levels of scrutiny applicable to equal protection claims "do not describe a completely logical
method of deciding cases, but rather is a method the Court has employed to explain decisions
that actually apply a single standard in a reasonably consistent fashion").
158
159
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the .. .justification put forward by the State is sufficient to make an
otherwise offensive classification acceptable."'"
To be sure, such an approach might increase courts' decision
costs. It might require complex assessments of complementary taxes,
evaluations of the overall tax burdens imposed by the state on
railroads and other industries, and inquiries into whether a state's
professed motives are genuine or pretextual. But courts take exactly
this approach in assessing claims of discrimination in other contexts.
For example, when faced with claims that a law discriminates in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, courts must look beyond objective factors such as discriminatory effects in order to determine
whether the law was passed with a discriminatory purpose."' This inquiry oftentimes requires extensive consideration of matters including the context in which the law was passed, the history of discrimination in the jurisdiction, and numerous other complicated and
fact-specific considerations.
Admittedly, courts have shown great reluctance to employ the
Equal Protection Clause (and other general antidiscrimination provisions, such as the Dormant Commerce Clause) to state tax regimes, 62
and the practical difficulties attendant to litigating these claims have
diminished their utility to aggrieved taxpayers. As such, they have
proven insufficient to protect railroads from discriminatory treatment. This does not mean, however, that an interpretation of the 4-R
Act that brings the statute's analysis into harmony with analogous
antidiscrimination laws is inappropriate or otherwise redundant. Rather, the 4-R Act acknowledges the shortcomings of existing antidisprovides
clear
statutory
crimination
provisions
and
authority by which courts may invalidate certain state taxes, thus
dispelling the prudential concerns that otherwise underlie courts' reluctance to invalidate tax provisions as discriminatory. When such a
statute lacks a clear method for assessing discrimination-as does
subsection (b)(4) -general antidiscrimination laws provide guidance
in interpreting and applying the Act.
It is also important to note that this approach does not contradict CSX Transportation's holding that subsection (b)(4) is more
than a simple anticircumvention rule. First, that holding spoke only
to the types of taxes covered by subsection (b)(4), determining that
all nonproperty taxes fell within its ambit, and not simply those
passed in lieu of a tax prohibited under subsections (b)(1)-(3). It did
160 Id at 212-13.
161
162

See Washington v Davis,426 US 229, 242 (1976).
For a discussion of the reasons for this, see Part IV.B.
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not speak to the standard for determining whether a tax discriminates, nor did it preclude courts from assessing the rationality of distinctions made by states among taxpayers. Second, this approach is
not confined to situations where the tax was designed with the intent
to circumvent the property tax provisions: if a tax draws distinctions
between railroads and other taxpayers without sufficient justification, it would be invalidated under this approach regardless of
whether the means chosen were designed to evade subsection
(b)(1)-(3)'s explicit proscriptions. As such, this interpretation gives
effect to the Supreme Court's command that subsection (b)(4) be
read as containing real and independent force.
Harmonizing Antidiscrimination Law
While the most prominent antidiscrimination statutes contain
some fixed comparison class," either explicitly or implicitly, a more
freewheeling approach is far from unprecedented. Indeed, both
Equal Protection Clause and Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence offer vague pronouncements against unequal treatment. In
both contexts, courts have adopted an analytical framework that
takes state-created classifications as a starting point and then subjects these classifications to some level of judicial scrutiny to determine the permissibility of differential treatment on a case-by-case
basis.
B.

1. Equal Protection Clause.
The Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution states that
"[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall ...deny to any

person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."'" This
provision has been invoked as a basis for challenging state laws alleged
to discriminate against certain classes of people or corporations.'5 Similarly to § 11501(b)(4), § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
163 See, for example, Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub L No 101-336, 104 Stat 327
(1990), codified as amended at 42 USC § 12101 et seq (barring discrimination "on the basis of
disability"); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub L No 90-202, 81 Stat 602,
codified as amended at 29 USC § 621 et seq (rendering it unlawful "to discriminate against any
individual because of such individual's age, or to classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis of such individual's age"); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat
253, codified as amended at 42 USC § 2000e et seq (outlawing "discriminatlion] against any
individual ... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin").
164 US Const Amend XIV, § 1.
165 See, for example, Allied Stores of Ohio v Bowers, 358 US 522, 526 (1959) ("[Tlhe
States, in the exercise of their taxing power, are subject to the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
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no comparison class and no definition of discrimination (indeed, it
does not even use the term). The Supreme Court, however, has filled
these gaps in a manner that guides an interpretation of the analogous
ambiguities found in the 4-R Act.
As a general matter, the Equal Protection Clause does not
require complete equality among all citizens. Rather, "where
individuals in the group affected by a law have distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the authority to implement, the courts have been very reluctant, as they should be in our
federal system and with our respect for the separation of powers, to
closely scrutinize legislative choices.""
But this prerogative is not without limit. Only classifications that
satisfy the "rational basis test," requiring a rational relationship between the distinction and the accomplishment of a legitimate governmental end, pass constitutional muster. 7 This guarantees states
substantial autonomy in drawing distinctions among citizens while
protecting against arbitrary and oppressive impositions placed upon
disfavored groups.
Unfortunately, courts have applied the Equal Protection Clause
such that it provides little relief to railroads facing discriminatory
taxation. These shortcomings demonstrate the need for the 4-R Act's
more robust statutory protections; they do not, however, illustrate a
shortcoming of the general analytical approach described above.
First, courts have shown particularly wide latitude to states
when confronting alleged discrimination in a state's tax system under
the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, "[w]here taxation is concerned
and no specific federal right, apart from equal protection, is imperiled, the States have large leeway in making classifications and drawing lines which in their judgment produce reasonable systems of taxation."'' " As the Court in Nordlinger v Hahn'69 noted, "the Equal
Protection Clause is satisfied so long as there is a plausible policy
reason for the classification.... This standard is especially deferential in the context of classifications made by complex tax laws.""'
166 City of Cleburne, Texas v Cleburne Living Center, 473 US 432, 441 (1985).
167 Allied Stores, 358 US at 528. Although higher levels of scrutiny may be employed
when a distinction is made based upon a suspect classification (such as race or alienage) or
when the distinction results in the circumscription of a fundamental right, "[w]hen social or
economic legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the States wide latitude."
Cleburne, 473 US at 440.
168 Lehnhausen v Lake Shore Auto Parts Co, 410 US 356, 359 (1973).
169 505 US 1 (1992).
170 Id at 11 (upholding a California property tax that assessed property value at the time
of a transfer of title, after which the maximum tax liability could only increase at a much lower
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This deference arises from a presumption that states, as sovereigns, are free to tax their citizenry as they like so long as doing so
does not impinge the prerogatives of the federal government or
violate federal rights."' When Congress passed the 4-R Act, however,
it overrode this background presumption of disengagement by explicitly authorizing courts to invalidate taxes that unjustifiably impose greater burdens on railroads as compared to other taxpayers. In
doing so, Congress demanded a more searching review of such taxes
than the Equal Protection Clause requires: courts must inquire, for
example, whether the tax exploits railroads' immobile or nonlocal
status and whether it undermines the Act's purposes. But in light of
the close analogue to the Equal Protection Clause, an interpretation
of the 4-R Act that draws upon the Equal Protection Clause's practice of assessing discrimination claims on the basis of the distinctions
that the state has crafted is both serviceable and sensible.
Second, under the Equal Protection Clause there is even greater
deference shown to state tax regimes when dealing with common
carriers. Relying on the special privileges that accrue to many such
carriers-for example, the right of eminent domain and the use of
public property-the Supreme Court has held that "these public service organizations have no valid ground by virtue of the equal protection clause to object to separate treatment related to such distinctions."' " While not every tax is correlated to such special privileges,
this nevertheless adds another hurdle for railroads challenging an allegedly discriminatory state tax, thus justifying statutory provisions
to further protect railroads from abusive state taxing practices.
Third, in addition to these substantive matters, the 4-R Act also
provides two major procedural advantages over the Equal Protection
Clause. "3 First, claims under the Act bypass the Tax Injunction Act,
allowing federal district courts to enjoin the collection of an allegedly
discriminatory tax, rather than requiring railroads to pay the tax and
then sue for reimbursement, as would otherwise be required.
Second, the 4-R Act allows railroads to bring a single suit in a federal
district court concerning the validity of the tax. This is a substantial
improvement over the previous legal regime, where railroads had to

annual rate than real property values, such that new home buyers paid substantially more in
property taxes than long-time owners).
171 See Allied Stores, 358 US at 526-27.
172 New York Rapid Transit Corp v City of New York, 303 US 573, 579 (1938) (upholding
an excise tax levied only upon railroads and other public utilities for the privilege of exercising
their franchise in New York City).
173 49 USC § 11501(c).
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sue in state court and were typically required to file an individual suit
in every county in which the tax was collected."
Against this background, the omission of both a comparison
class and a definition of discrimination from subsection (b)(4)

appears to reflect a deliberate desire to preserve the case-by-case assessment otherwise applicable to state-created classifications while
permitting courts to enjoin discriminatory taxes more freely and
more efficiently.'5 Congress meant what it said-and what it did not
say-in subsection (b)(4), and for a court to insert a fixed comparison class where the text of the statute plainly omits one undermines
this legislative determination. This interpretation of subsection
(b)(4) is consistent with the text of the 4-R Act, its dual purposes,
and its legislative history, which reveals a primary concern with
property taxes (where the prohibition on discrimination is accompanied by careful definitions) and a late adoption of subsection (b)(4)

to serve an anticircumvention function.
2. Dormant Commerce Clause.
Similarly to the Equal Protection Clause, the Dormant Com-

merce Clause protects against discrimination, yet it is far from clear
whether it provides a fixed comparison class and, if it does, what that
comparison class comprises." While in some cases the Court seems

to apply a straightforward comparison class of out-of-state competitors, in others it takes a more nuanced view, either wholly dispelling
the idea that disparities vis-A-vis out-of-state interests are relevant,
or else showing much greater tolerance for such disparities when the

See note 61 and accompanying text.
Indeed, 49 USC § 11501(c) grants federal courts authority to issue injunctions against
discriminatory state taxes, notwithstanding the Tax Injunction Act.
176 Compare Exxon Corp v Governor of Maryland, 437 US 117, 127-28 (1978) (observing
that "the [Dormant Commerce] Clause protects the interstate market, not particular interstate
firms, from prohibitive or burdensome regulations"), with Oregon Waste Systems, Inc v Department of Environmental Quality of Oregon, 511 US 93, 99 (1994) (noting that "'discrimination' simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that
benefits the former and burdens the latter"). But see C&A Carbone, Inc v Town of Clarkstown, New York, 511 US 383, 394-95 (1994) (upholding a challenge to a local ordinance
brought by a local business on the ground that it inhibited the business from engaging in trade
with nonlocal firms). Consider also Saul Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and JudicialIntervention, 69 Va L Rev 563, 570-75 (1983) (reconciling courts' disparate approaches to Dormant
Commerce Clause claims by distinguishing between "interferences," which other states may
replicate, and "exploitations," where the defending state has a monopoly over the protected
good or service).
174
175
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questioned program appears reasonable.'" Whatever the framing, the
case law reveals that states are granted substantial discretion to draw
distinctions among taxpayers, especially when necessary to implement state policies. This is a far cry from the virtually per se invalidity that applies under the fixed comparison class approaches under
subsection (b)(4).'7"
Some Supreme Court precedent indicates that there is no fixed
comparison class for Dormant Commerce Clause claims, since the
primary concern of the provision is preventing "interfere[nce] with
the natural functioning of the interstate market either through prohibition or burdensome regulation.'". While the nature of politics is
such that states will typically interfere with interstate markets by discriminating against foreign interests and in favor of local ones,
adopting an inflexible comparison class of out-of-state competitors
risks significant errors when laws burdening interstate commerce operate to the detriment of some, but not all, local firms. The Supreme
Court seems to have acknowledged as much and has invalidated
state policies under the Dormant Commerce Clause even when they
discriminate against local rather than foreign interests."' This indicates that the true standard under the Dormant Commerce Clause is
not whether a policy discriminates against a fixed comparison class
but whether a given policy unjustifiably allocates burdens or benefits
in a manner contrary to the purpose of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, with courts assessing the distribution of these burdens and
benefits-as well as their justifications-based on the facts of the
individual case.
Even when the courts do speak in terms implying a fixed comparison class of out-of-state competitors, they provide greater deference to states than the current approaches to subsection (b)(4). The
scrutiny that courts show in determining whether the discrimination
prong of this test is satisfied varies based upon the form and effect of
the statute at issue. Importantly, however, the fact that the burden
might be borne disproportionately by out-of-state interests does not
itself spell invalidity. For example, in Commonwealth Edison Company v Montana,'"' the Supreme Court upheld a state severance tax
on coal notwithstanding the fact that 90 percent of such coal was
177
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shipped out of state."n In another case, a state law requiring divestiture of retail service stations by companies that also produced or refined petroleum was permitted, although only out-of-state corporations satisfied those conditions. " Although the statutes at issue in
these cases did not classify based on residence in so many words,
neither did many of the taxes invalidated under the functional
and competitive approaches. So long as these regimes were reasonably related to a valid local purpose, the Court deferred to the
states' judgment.
Even distinctions that facially distinguish between in-state and
out-of-state interests may be upheld, although they are subject to
stricter scrutiny.'" Considering a state law banning the import of
waste from out of state, the Supreme Court specifically noted that
"discriminating against articles of commerce coming from outside
the State [is impermissible] unless there is some reason, apart from
their origin, to treat them differently.'.. In Maine v Taylor,'" just such
a reason existed. There, Maine had issued a blanket ban on the import of live baitfish into the state, as such fish might carry parasites
not present locally. The Supreme Court upheld this prohibition because it served a legitimate local purpose, and there was no nondiscriminatory means by which the state could have protected against
the harm."'
Indeed, the Court has even rejected the proposition that interstate commerce itself is immune from reasonable state taxation." Instead, states are shown some leeway in framing taxes that may disproportionately burden interstate commerce, and such a tax will be
upheld when it is "applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with
the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against
interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the service provided by
the State... 9
Although the analogy is imperfect, the Court's approach to
Dormant Commerce Clause claims reflects an understanding that
the lack of a specified comparison class provides greater flexibility in
assessing alleged violations, with a primary focus on the reasonableId at 618-19.
Exxon Corp, 437 US at 127-28.
184 City of Philadelphia v New Jersey, 437 US 617, 624 (1978) (noting that a statute passed
out of "simple economic protectionism" is "virtually per se" invalid).
185 Id at 626-27 (emphasis added).
186 477 US 131 (1986).
187 Id at 151.
188 Complete Auto Transit, Inc v Brady, 430 US 274, 288 (1977).
189 Id at 279.
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ness of state classifications. Whether courts frame their analysis as
eschewing a fixed comparison class or modifying how compelling a
rationale must be to justify a distinction, the fact remains that the assessment is much more fact-dependent than the virtually per se
invalidity that the current approaches to subsection (b)(4) entail.
CONCLUSION

The question of which comparison class to apply to alleged tax
discrimination under § 11501(b)(4) of the 4-R Act has divided the
courts. This division has created great uncertainty for both railroads
trying to forecast their tax liabilities and states attempting to devise a
tax regime that advances their policy goals without violating federal
statutory commands. Furthermore, the efficient and expeditious attainment of the goals of the 4-R Act is undermined by such disharmony, especially in a market defined by its interstate scope.
The various approaches that courts have adopted to solve this
problem have erroneously assumed that § 11501(b)(4) requires a
fixed comparison class against which to measure alleged discrimination. Such approaches, however, are inconsistent with both the text
and the structure of the statute. Moreover, they fail to adequately
protect railroads while unjustifiably discounting Congress's concern
that the 4-R Act not unduly impinge upon states' taxing authority.
Rather than writing a comparison class into the text of a statute that
appears to purposefully omit one, courts should instead grant states
the prerogative to classify their taxpayers as they see fit, while
readily invalidating classifications that perniciously capitalize on railroads' nonlocal status or their large fixed-capital investment in
the state.
This state-centered approach provides adequate protection for
railroads while also preserving the states' taxing prerogatives. This
approach is analogous to the analysis employed by courts in similar
antidiscrimination contexts, but which in their present form incompletely or inadequately redress the problems identified by Congress
in the 4-R Act.

